

**Panel:** Building Global Nuclear Security Architecture (Grand Ballroom III)

**Date/Time:** Wednesday, February 20, 2013 /09:00-10:15

**Talking Points for:** Kenneth Brill, Independent Consultant, Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group

- A global approach to nuclear security governance is needed because:
  - nuclear energy is becoming more widespread, increasing the need for effective nuclear security in more places;
  - global terrorist groups have stated their intention to use nuclear materials for malicious purposes and have demonstrated their geographic mobility -- so nuclear security means collaborating across borders, not just maintaining security within borders;
  - a nuclear terrorist event would significantly affect the global economy, the global political/security system and global stability -- and disproportionately affect those least able to bear new burdens; and
  - states have obligations to the international community, not just their citizens, to secure nuclear material that could cause widespread harm.
- Many speak of a global nuclear security architecture/regime, consisting of:
  - the IAEA;
  - the CPPNM and ICSANT treaties;
  - UNSC Resolutions 1373, 1540 and 1887; and
  - multilateral and bilateral initiatives, such as the G-8 Global Partnership.
- Sounds like a lot of governance until one examines what is covered.
  - The IAEA does good work, but on a voluntary, non-binding basis.
  - The CPPNM still only covers materials in transport; the ICSANT criminalizes nuclear security incidents; it does not address nuclear security operations.
  - The UNSC resolutions do not address nuclear security operations.
  - Initiatives, like the G-8 Global Partnership and the Nuclear Security Summits focus on voluntary actions by like-minded states, rather than developing a seamless global nuclear security regime.
- Mismatch between consequences of nuclear terrorism and efforts to prevent it, despite the fact the international community cannot afford to respond to nuclear terrorism -- it must be prevented.
- The current nuclear security “regime” has no binding standards, no assessment or transparency process for how states are meeting their security responsibilities and, as the NSS process runs out of steam, no long-term mechanism for providing political oversight and direction.
  - It is a “regime” full of weak links.
- The time has come to move from piecemeal steps by like-minded states to the actions needed to build a truly global and robust nuclear security regime with binding standards, transparency and long-term oversight.

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\* The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.

- Should not wait until after a nuclear terrorist event to develop a robust nuclear security regime, doing so would be unforgivable given what we know now.

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